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Manufacturers are increasingly being required to adhere to product take-back regulations that 
require them to manage their products at the end of life. Such regulations seek to internalize 
products’ entire life cycle costs into market prices, with the ultimate objective of reducing their 
environmental burden. This article provides a framework to evaluate the potential for take-back 
regulations to actually lead to reduced environmental impacts and to stimulate product design 
changes. It describes trade-offs associated with several major policy decisions, including whether 
to hold firms physically or financially responsible for the recovery of their products, when to 
impose recycling fees, whether to include disposal and hazardous substance bans, and whether to 
mandate product design features to foster reuse and recycling of components and materials. The 
framework also addresses policy elements that can significantly affect the cost efficiency and 
occupational safety hazards of end-of-life product recovery operations. The evaluation framework 
is illustrated with examples drawn from take-back regulations promulgated in Europe, Japan, and 
the United States governing waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). 
 
Managing products at the end of life (EOL) is of growing concern for durable goods 
manufacturers. Whereas some manufacturers engage in voluntary take back of EOL products for 
a variety of competitive reasons (Toffel, 2004), the past decade has seen the rapid proliferation 
of government regulations and policies requiring manufacturers to collect and recycle their 
products, or pay others to do so on their behalf. These product “take back” regulations and 
policies represent an innovative approach to reducing the volume and toxicity of waste. Applying 
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the “polluter pays principle” that calls on governments to “take those actions necessary to ensure 
that polluters and users of natural resources bear the full environmental and social costs of their 
activities” (Hunter, Salzman, and Zaelke, 2002), these policies impose part or all of the recycling 
and disposal costs on manufacturers.  
A few scholars have begun the important work of evaluating the environmental impacts 
of particular take back policies in Japan (Ogushu and Kandlikar, 2007) and Europe (Barba-
Gutierrez, Adenso-Diaz, and Hopp, 2008; Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007; Hischier, Wager, and 
Gauglhofer, 2005), albeit constrained by limited data given the novelty of these policies.
3 Further 
complicating such analysis are varying approaches to measuring environmental performance 
(Huppes and Ishikawa, 2005; Michelsen, Magerholm Fet, and Dahlsrud, 2007; Toffel and 
Marshall, 2004).  However, the literature lacks an analysis of how key elements of take-back 
policies can affect their ability to achieving their objectives of reducing environmental impacts, 
including by stimulating produce redesign that considers recyclability. In this article, we describe 
such a framework, and include an analysis of how certain policy features can affect the cost 
efficiency of, and occupational safety associated with, EOL product recovery. In doing so, we 
seek to provide guidance to policy makers, managers, and scholars who are contemplating 
formulating, responding to, and assessing take-back policies.   
In summary, our evaluation identifies key take back policy elements that may be used to 
reduce harm to the environment and public health and the occupational health and safety of those 
involved in recovery operations, and to encourage cost efficiency (see Figure 1).   The 
framework describes tradeoffs involved in mandating financial or physical responsibilities; 
imposing advanced- or end-of-life recycling fees; allowing collective (versus individual) 
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recycling operations; requiring recycler and waste processor certifications; and including 
recovery and recycling targets, disposal bans, substance bans, design-for-environment 
requirements, and export controls. The evaluation framework is illustrated with examples drawn 
from take-back regulations promulgated in Europe, Japan, and the United States. This framework 
focuses on the product category of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) because it 
is the target of many, and perhaps most, government take back policies around the world. 
Nonetheless, our framework is readily applicable to take-back policies that govern other 
categories of durable goods as well.  
Figure 1. Take-back policy features  
Mitigating environmental and public health risks 
  Recovery and recycling targets 
  Timing of recycling fees 
  Disposal bans 
  Substance bans 
  Design and substance requirements 
Promoting cost efficiency 
  Financial versus physical responsibility  
  Individual versus collective operations  
  Appropriate advanced disposal fees 
Protecting occupational health and safety 
  Recycler and waste processor certification 
  Export controls 
 
Policy rationale 
Imposing part or all of the costs of recovering and recycling EOL products on their 
producers is meant to create incentives for producers to modify product designs in ways that 
minimize such costs, such as by facilitating the reuse and recycling of components and materials 4 
 
(Hanisch, 2000; Toffel, 2003). It also represents a movement to privatize the costs of this 
growing source of waste, both to unburden governments and to tap the private sector’s profit 
motive in anticipation that improved operational efficiency will reduce EOL product 
management costs. For example, when take-back laws in Japan shifted these responsibilities 
from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to the private sector, the latter reduced recycling costs 
of major home appliances by more than half (Ogushu and Kandlikar, 2007).  
Take-back regulations also seek to reduce environmental impact under the assumption 
that this occurs when greater proportions of end-of-life products, components, and materials are 
reused, recycled, and recovered (Mayers, France, and Cowell, 2005). This assumption is based 
on a life cycle-based principle that posits that, compared to landfill disposal, the environmental 
burden of end-of-life product management is reduced the greatest by measures to prevent 
disposal such as durability, followed by reuse, followed by recycling. Indeed life cycle studies of 
end-of-life disposal of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) have provided some 
empirical support for this conventional “Reduce, Reuse, Recycle” waste management hierarchy 
(Brinkley et al., 1994; McLaren et al., 1999).  
To ensure that the intended shift from disposal to recycling occurs in practice once EOL 
management responsibilities shift from the government to the private sector, many take-back 
regulations impose minimum collection and recycling thresholds. These targets seek to reduce 
the amount of hazardous materials disposed of in landfills and incinerators, increase the 
availability of recyclable and recycled materials to encourage their substitution for virgin 
materials, and thereby reduce the life cycle environmental burden of both current and next 
generation products (Toffel, 2003).  5 
 
Policy proliferation 
Take-back regulations have targeted a wide array of products including packaging, 
batteries, automobiles, and electronics (Toffel, 2003). WEEE is the most frequent target of take-
back regulations because it is both a fast growing portion of the waste stream and often contains 
hazardous materials and potentially recyclable materials such as metals (European Commission, 
2002). Take-back regulations have been enacted over the past decade in many European and East 
Asian nations (Toffel, 2003). In the United States, the states of Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, 
North Carolina Oregon, Texas, and Washington have passed take-back regulations that require 
producers to pay at least some portion of end-of-life collection and recycling costs of WEEE. 
Several attempts to pass federal legislation in the United States have failed (Electronics Take 
Back Coalition, 2008). Perhaps the most comprehensive example is the European Union’s (EU) 
Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE Directive), which took effect in 
August 2005 (European Parliament and European Council, 2003c). The WEEE Directive “seeks 
to minimize the impact of electronic equipment on the environment both during its product 
lifetime and when it becomes waste by making the manufacturer responsible for both disposal 
and recycling” (Quinell, 2005). The directive requires EU member states to pass legislation that 
imposes all recycling and waste management costs of WEEE on the producers of the products, 
including transportation costs from collection centers.  
Mitigating environmental and public health risks 
The primary goal of product take-back regulations governing electronic products is to 
reduce the environmental impacts and public health risks associated with their production, use, 
and disposal. In part, these concerns result from obsolete electronic products constituting one the 
fastest growing waste streams, much of which contains hazardous substances that can leach into 6 
 
groundwater if disposed of in conventional landfills (California Department of Toxic Substance 
Control, 2001; Musson et al., 2000; Yang, 1993) or pollute the air when incinerated. They are 
often difficult to recycle due to these and other toxins such as flame retardants, and due to the 
fact that many have not been designed for deconstruction. For example, the picture tubes in CRT 
monitors and televisions, which contain several pounds of lead embedded in the glass, have 
failed leachability tests, suggesting significant risk of contaminating groundwater. Incinerating 
these wastes is also problematic because the associated heating and cooling cycles have the 
potential to induce the formation of hazardous by-products that can be emitted into the air as well 
as of high concentrations of toxic substances in the remaining slag, fly ash, char,  and filter cake 
(Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, 1999; US Environmental Protection Agency, 1989).  
In this section, we describe take-back policy features that seek to reduce harm to the 
environment and public health. These might address product disposal, s u c h  a s  b y  i m p o s i n g  
recycling targets and disposal fees or banning EOL products from municipal solid waste streams. 
They might target product design, such as by banning or requiring the use of particular materials 
or by mandating particular design features. Below, we describe these features and how they can 
reduce environmental harm, in many cases providing examples of regulations that embody these 
features. 
recovery and recycling targets 
Take-back regulations might stipulate that particular proportions of EOL products be 
recovered and recycled. Many of these targets, including those imposed by the European Union’s 
WEEE Directive, are based on product mass. The EU directive requires producers of IT and 
telecommunications equipment to recover “a minimum of 75% by an average weight per 
appliance” and reuse and recycle “a minimum of 65% by an average weight per appliance.” 
Scholars have raised serious concerns that mass-based targets are a poor proxy for achieving the 7 
 
policy objective of minimizing life cycle environmental impacts (Atlee and Kirchain, 2006; 
Huisman, 2004), and that such targets can create perverse incentives (Huisman et al., 2006; 
Mayers et al., 2005). For example, mass-based targets could create incentives for producers to 
employ heavy but easily recyclable materials instead of lighter disposable materials, even when 
the latter would result in lower life cycle environmental impacts (Ferrao, Nazareth, and Amaral, 
2006; Huisman et al., 2006; Mayers et al., 2005). Instead of mass-based targets, these scholars 
and practitioners call for regulators to impose “specific environmental objectives and operating 
standards for treatment and recycling processes” (Mayers et al., 2005), and to choose targets 
based on “environmental weights” that account for relative environmental impacts throughout 
the life cycles of products and materials (Huisman et al., 2006). These more refined targets seem 
far more likely to help take-back regulations achieve their potential for reducing environmental 
impacts while avoiding perverse incentives, although it is unclear how complicated and 
customized such targets should be. For example, ideal targets from an environmental perspective 
might vary substantially by geography (e.g., urban/rural, distance to recyclers) and product 
classification (e.g., based on material composition), but implementing overly customized targets 
for these factors could conflict with other policy concerns including equity across political 
boundaries and simplicity for EOL product owners. 
Timing of recycling fees 
Take-back policies might stipulate particular disposal fees to cover the cost of recycling. 
Some policies require these fees to be imposed at the time of purchase (“advanced disposal [or 
recovery] fees”), others at the time of disposal. In Japan, the timing varies by product: fees are 
collected at the time of purchase for computers and automobiles, and upon disposal for home 
appliances (Ogushu and Kandlikar, 2007). California imposes a uniform advanced disposal fee 
on all covered electronic products.  8 
 
Requiring disposal fees to be paid at the time of purchase rather than upon disposal offers 
two benefits. First, these fees are effectively incorporated in the purchase price of products, 
which enable prices to better reflect products’ life cycle costs. Second, advance disposal fees 
avoid the disincentives for proper disposal created by disposal fees charged at the time of 
disposal. Because the latter require payment of a disposal fee at the time of disposal some 
owners of regulated EOL products might attempt to illegally mix their EOL products into the 
municipal waste stream or illegally dump them. For example, illegal disposal of major household 
appliances increased substantially after Japan imposed disposal fees on these products (Ogushu 
and Kandlikar, 2007).   
California’s experience its advance disposal fee highlights one drawback of this 
approach: the need to accurately project costs. In 2007, the cumulative advance recovery fees the 
state had been collecting since its take back regulations took effect in 2004 were depleted, 
forcing the state to significantly raise the advanced recovery fee. California’s unusual policy, in 
reality a form of a sales tax, allowed the state to reassess its fee every two years to ensure it paid 
for the collection and recycling costs of all covered waste electronics products.
4 If manufacturers 
(or governments) set recovery fees at the time a particular electronics product were collected, 
they could more accurately forecast its collection and recycling costs given prevailing 
technologies and scale economies.  
Disposal bans 
Take-back regulations that stipulate recycling targets do not require 100 percent recycling 
rates, as achieving such a high rate is generally acknowledged to be prohibitively expensive. 
Thus, even under regimes with stringent take-back regulations, some fraction of WEEE is still 
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expected to be deposited in landfills or incinerated, and its hazardous materials component might 
thus still be cause for environmental concern. This risk can be further reduced by disposal bans. 
For example, a 2006 New Hampshire law banned the disposal of video display devices in 
conventional landfills and incinerators. Other states, including California, Maine, and 
Massachusetts, have imposed similar bans. By redirecting WEEE from landfills and incinerators 
to recycling outlets, disposal bans can also increase the supply of materials recovered from these 
products (e.g., glass from CRTs) (Toto, 2003). This lowers the cost of recycled materials, which 
can encourage their substitution for virgin materials.      
When accompanied by disposal fees charged at the time of disposal, disposal bans carry a 
risk of leading owners to stockpile WEEE within their homes or offices. For example, the US 
EPA estimates that, in 2005, 180 million EOL computers and televisions remained in storage 
(US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Solid Waste, 2007). Delaying the entry of 
WEEE to recycling markets diminishes its ability to offset demand for the virgin materials for 
which it could substitute. 
Substance bans 
Policy makers can prevent particular substances from WEEE from harming the 
environment or posing a risk to public health by banning those substances from products. The 
EU took this unusual step when it implemented the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous 
Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) Directive, which took effect in 2006 
(European Parliament and European Council, 2003b). This directive banned mercury, cadmium, 
lead, chromium VI, and two brominated flame retardants from electronics sold in the EU due to 
concerns about the impact of these substances on human health and the environment. The EU 
took this fairly drastic step based on the view that these substances “would be likely to pose risks 
to health or the environment” even if the products that contained them were recycled (European 10 
 
Parliament and European Council, 2003a). Such policies can ban some toxic substances for 
which alternatives already exist, and also spur the development of new alternatives. For example, 
the EU’s RoHS Directive was the “primary force” that drove the development of lead-free solder 
for use with electronics (Schoenung et al., 2004). China has implemented regulations quite 
similar to the EU’s RoHS Directive (People's Republic of China Ministry of Commerce, 2006), 
and Japan has implemented an ordinance that requires that special warning labels be affixed to 
products that contain any of the six substances banned by the EU’s RoHS Directive (Japan's 
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 2006). 
Design-for-environment requirements 
While product design can significantly affect the product’s life cycle environmental 
impact and the efficiency of reverse logistics operations (Krikke, Bloemhof-Ruwaard, and Van 
Wassenhove, 2003; Walter and Spengler, 2005). a minority of products are designed with 
disassembly and recycling in mind (Pagell, Wu, and Murthy, 2007). This is perhaps unsurprising, 
given that conventional disposal regulations provide no incentives for manufacturers to invest in 
increasing the recyclability or reducing the recycling costs of their EOL products. Take-back 
regulations structured to impose on producers the costs of recycling and disposing of their own 
EOL products, by forcing the internalization of these costs, could provide sufficient incentive for 
producers to amend their product designs to facilitate recycling and avoid costly handling of 
hazardous substances. As explained below, policies often allow producers to engage in collective 
approaches that, while reducing costs by tapping economies of scale, leave producers with much 
weaker incentives to make such investments.  
Policy makers have an even more direct option for stimulating design investments: they 
can mandate particular design features. Policies could, for example, require producers to make 
toxic components easily visible and removable, direct producers to label the material content of 11 
 
plastics and other difficult to identify materials, and encourage or require the use of materials 
that can be recycled multiple times and for which recycling markets exist. Such policy 
requirements are rare. The European Union came close when it established with its Directive on 
the eco-design of Energy-using Products (EuP), which took effect August, 2007, a framework for 
environmental design considerations for a variety of products (European Parliament and 
European Council, 2005). The directive calls on manufacturers to conduct an environmental 
assessment of their products that considers the full product life cycle, and to make design 
improvements that enhance their environmental performance. It does not, however, impose legal 
obligations on manufacturers. The initial focus of the directive was on electric motor systems, 
HVAC equipment, water heaters, domestic appliances, consumer electronics, office equipment, 
and lighting (EIATRACK, 2007). In the United States, President George W. Bush’s Executive 
Order 13423, issued in January 2007, requires all federal agencies to ensure that 95 percent of 
the electronic products they purchase meet the Electronic Product Environmental Assessment 
Tool (EPEAT) standard (Bush, 2007). The EPEAT standard imposes a variety of product design 
requirements including identifying materials that require special handling and the contents of 
plastic components, and avoiding certain substances including those restricted by the EU RoHS 
Directive . 
Policies can also require producers to incorporate minimum thresholds of recycled 
content or recyclable content in their products, which could simultaneously increase the demand 
for recycled materials, reduce the flow of recovered materials to landfills or incineration, and 
reduce demand for virgin materials. For example, the EPEAT criteria requires at least 65 percent 
of products’ materials be reusable or recyclable using current infrastructure and technologies 
(Bush, 2007). Outside the domain of WEEE, the EU’s End of Life Vehicle Directive (2006) 12 
 
requires that all automobiles manufactured in the EU for domestic use have a recyclable content 
of 85 percent (95 percent by 2015) so that each vehicle that is manufactured can be reclaimed, 
dismantled, and recycled at the end of its useful life (Crotty, 2006). Replacing virgin materials 
with recycled materials yields environmental benefits when the latter require less energy, as is 
the case with glass cullet recovered from EOL CRTs (Enviros, 2002). The latter also avoids the 
environmental impacts associated with extraction of nonrenewable resources such as metals.  
 
Promoting cost efficiency 
Take-back policies can incorporate varying degrees of regulatory flexibility that can 
dramatically affect compliance costs. We focus on two forms of regulatory flexibility: the type of 
responsibility assigned to parties, and the extent of operational flexibility permitted.  
Cost efficiency from financial, rather than physical, responsibility  
Policies that impose on producers the physical responsibility for collecting, transporting, 
and recycling EOL products require the responsible parties to conduct collection, transportation, 
and recycling operations. Policies that impose physical responsibility can thus be viewed as a 
form of “command-and-control” regulation.  
Regulations that impose physical responsibility are far more restrictive than regulations 
that impose financial responsibility. The latter require only that producers underwrite these 
activities, which enables them to decide which (if any) they will conduct themselves and which 
they will outsource. Assuming producers choose to conduct activities that they can do more cost-
effectively than the market and outsource the others to the market, regulations that impose 
financial responsibilities will result in lower costs than those that impose physical 
responsibilities.  13 
 
Collective responsibility and design incentives  
Take-back polices can require manufacturers to be responsible for their own EOL 
products (“individual responsibility”), or allow or require all producers within an industry to be 
responsible for all EOL products in their industry (“collective responsibility”). Recalling that a 
primary rationale for product take-back regulations is to motivate producers to alter their design 
process to facilitate disposal and recycling (Mayers et al., 2005), some have argued that this 
incentive is most effective under individual responsibility, whereby producers are responsible for 
their own EOL products (Castell, Clift, and Francae, 2004; Toffel, 2003). This logic is based on 
individual responsibility assuring that companies incur the full costs of collecting and recycling 
their own products, which supports the key objective of take-back policies of having firms 
internalize the EOL costs of their products, potentially stimulating changes in product design to 
reduce these costs. On the other hand, individual responsibility (like physical responsibility, 
discussed above) constrains producers’ choices and therefore can lead to higher implementation 
costs. 
During the drafting process of the EU’s WEEE Directive, the trade association Orgalime 
argued against individual responsibility, urging the EU to give producers the choice of 
developing collective recycling infrastructures, noting that “[i]ndividual responsibility can be 
achieved within and is compatible with collectively set up and operated take-back, treatment and 
recycling systems” (Orgalime, 2002). Providing this flexibility enables producers to pursue 
operational strategies that are most cost effective with respect to their circumstances. Some 
producers have jointly established consortia called Producer Responsibility Organizations 
(PROs) to manage product recovery for entire product sectors, the collective nature of which 
enables economies of scale in recycling operations. Because PROs attempt to minimize their 
transaction costs, many allocate their overall operating costs to producer-members based simply 14 
 
on the number of units processed for each, without regard to differences in the recycling costs or 
residual value of different brands or models.  
This practice of PROs charging a uniform fee regardless of product characteristics 
undermines the policy objective of sending a clear cost signal to producers meant to motivate 
investments in design changes that reduce recycling costs or increase the residual value of their 
EOL products. With uniform PRO fees, reduced recycling costs that derive from investments in 
product design changes will not accrue exclusively to those that make such investments. Instead, 
the benefits will be diluted. Any value created, such as faster disassembly or lower hazardous 
material management costs, would accrue to the PRO, which would then charge lower fees to all 
producer-members including competitors of the firm(s) that made such investments. Incentives 
to make such investments will be substantially eroded, perhaps to the point that none will be 
made. Fishbein addresses this issue with her admonition that PRO fees ought to “be structured to 
assure that a company benefits from designing products that are less wasteful and/or more 
recyclable; if not, a major benefit of EPR can be lost” (Fishbein, 2000).  
In practice, PROs such as Belgium’s Recupel have eschewed model-level or even brand-
level fees, preferring the simpler scheme of assessing a common fee for each product type (e.g., 
computer monitor, laptop). Similarly, Lindhqvist and Lifset noted a lack of “any real attempts” 
by PROs at “differentiation of the product fees linked to the real costs of handling the various 
products” (Lindhqvist and Lifset, 2003). The European Recycling Platform, a pan-European 
PRO established by major electronics producers, allocates its EOL collection, recycling, and 
disposal costs to its member producers “based on real collection volumes processed by ERP 
members in relation to their market share within ERP per product category” (European 
Recycling Platform, 2008). Mayers notes that the 260 PROs across the European Union that deal 15 
 
with EOL batteries, packaging, and WEEE recover costs from producers either through fees 
based on product categories or by allocating actual costs according to each producer’s market 
share of sales (Mayers, 2007). Thus, at best, fees are allocated by brand according to units sold, 
rather than by the number of models that are recovered, which would provide more appropriate 
incentives to invest in the design changes that take-back policies were meant to encourage. Sony 
and other producers have been calling for PRO fee structures that enable individual companies to 
benefit from their Design for Environment investments. As a Sony manager commented, “PROs 
could be managed in such a way that producers are made financially responsible for the take-
back costs associated with their own products using take-back and recycling processes that are 
managed collectively, and without incurring prohibitive costs” (Mayers, 2007).  
Imposing a flexible fee system would require PRO recycling operations to track model 
tallies, which could be costly given the proliferation of product models over the past years, any 
combination of which might arrive on any given day at a PRO’s loading dock. With the 
development of radio frequency and other technologies, cheaper methods might emerge for more 
easily identifying models at recycling operations, which could lead to a more precise cost 
allocation to producers and to a restoration of design incentives. 
Advanced disposal fees based on recycling costs 
Even if PROs charged the same fee to all producer-members, policy-makers could create 
an alternative incentive, by influencing effective product prices, to encourage producers to invest 
in design changes that reduce EOL product management costs. Specifically, policy makers could 
impose advanced recycling fees that vary by product model commensurate with the EOL 
management cost relative to competing products. Models that are cheaper to recycle, because 
they are easier to disassemble or possess materials more valuable on secondary markets, should 
be assessed lower fees. This would essentially operate as a sliding tax that rewards or penalizes 16 
 
models based on design features that affect their EOL management costs. These fees should 
reflect estimates of actual recycling costs and be transferred to the appropriate PRO, or directly 
to the producer if it individually manages its EOL products.  Unfortunately, most legislation that 
imposes advanced recycling fees does so by mandating uniform product fees by product category 
regardless of brand and model. Under these circumstances, PRO’s must initiate product 
standards for deconstruction and recyclability to close the loop with manufacturers to enable 
design for the environment. Policies that impose uniform fees should be reviewed in light of the 
disincentives they can create. 
Protecting occupational health and safety  
Dismantling and recycling EOL products creates occupational health and safety risks, 
especially when the individuals conducting these activities are not protected by enforced 
regulations. Most of the nearly two million monitors recycled in 1997 were exported for 
disassembly and processing (Fisher, 2000). A great deal of WEEE recycling takes place in 
countries such as China, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines that have inexpensive labor and lack 
rigorously enforced health and safety regulations, which has resulted in very hazardous working 
conditions (Puckett et al., 2002; Schoenberger, 2002; Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition, 
Californians Against Waste, and Materials for the Future, 2001). In the United States, prison 
labor has been used to dismantle WEEE, which also evokes concern because these individuals 
are exempt from many federal health and safety regulations and inmates who report problems 
risk retribution (Davis and Smith, 2003). The poor working conditions found in many venues 
that have recently emerged to dismantle and recycle WEEE have led to calls for governmental 
and private sector approaches to improve occupational safety and health conditions.  17 
 
The most pertinent government policy related to this issue is the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel 
Convention), an international treaty that took effect in 1992. Of the 170 parties to the convention, 
only Afghanistan, Haiti, and the United States have failed to ratify it (Basel Convention, 2008). 
By ratifying the convention, potential WEEE exporting nations such as EU member countries 
and Japan have agreed to ensure that their exporters honor national import bans on hazardous 
waste and, when shipping to countries that allow such imports, require exporters to obtain 
written acknowledgement that the importing country will accept each hazardous waste shipment. 
Parties to the convention, which also include WEEE importers such as China, India, and 
Pakistan, are required to uphold equivalent terms even when importing from or exporting to 
countries that have not ratified the convention such as the United States.  
The more substantive 1995 Basel Ban Amendment, if and when it takes effect, would 
prohibit members of the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) from exporting hazardous waste for final disposal, recycling, or recovery to less 
developed countries (LDCs) that are non-OECD member states. Three-fourths of its parties must 
ratify the amendment for it to take effect, which had not yet occurred by early 2008. Although 
the ban is not binding on any of its signatories, the majority of OECD countries including all EU 
member states as well as Norway, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Iceland have nonetheless 
unilaterally implemented its restrictions (Puckett et al., 2002).  
The United States has ratified neither the Basel Convention nor the Basel Ban. No US 
law prevents the export of hazardous wastes from the United States to LDCs for disposal, 
recovery, or recycling. The US Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires only 
that exporters of waste to LDCs notify the US Environmental Protection Agency prior to 18 
 
disembarking of the waste quantity, destination, and transportation and disposal methods, and 
obtain written consent from the destination country. At least one environmental pressure group 
has called for US legislation that imposes export restrictions similar to those adopted by the EU 
(Electronics Take Back Coalition, 2008). 
Because international treaties such as the Basel Convention are difficult to enforce, and 
the more stringent Basel Ban has yet to take effect, some public interest groups are encouraging 
companies to enforce the terms of these agreements through their supply chains. For example, 
the Electronics Take-Back Coalition and the Basel Action Network, two non-governmental 
organizations, have developed a code of conduct called the “Manufacturer’s Commitment to 
Responsible E-Waste Recycling” that calls on companies to adopt three practices:  
  comply with the terms of the Basel Convention and Basel Ban  irrespective of whether 
these agreements are in legal force in any particular country;  
  avoid relying on prison labor for any recycling or disassembly of hazardous electronic 
waste; and 
  make “every reasonable effort…to control all hazardous electronic wastes and manage 
their disposal as hazardous waste and therefore prevent them from entering solid waste 
landfills or incinerators” (Electronics Take Back Coalition, 2008). 
This commitment, which had been signed only by Sony Electronics USA as of January 
2008, covers all electronic waste generated by the manufacturer’s operations worldwide, whether 
directly via manufacturing or indirectly via take-back programs, and applies to recycling 
operations anywhere in the world regardless of the status of international treaties and stringency 
or enforcement of domestic regulations, even among recycling operations (such as those that use 
prison labor) that might be exempt from domestic regulations. 19 
 
Discussion 
This article has developed a framework for evaluating the extent to which regulations that 
extend producers’ responsibilities to manage their EOL products offer the potential to reduce 
their environmental impact in an effective and cost-efficient manner, while providing adequate 
occupational health and safety protection. This evaluation framework can be applied to assess a 
wide variety of take-back policies that target EOL products such as electronics, batteries, 
vehicles, and packaging. Data will become increasingly available as time passes, enabling 
researchers to empirically test the concepts presented in this article based on performance 
metrics already emerging (Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007; Mayers et al., 2005). 
Extending our framework represents another opportunity for future research. While prior 
researchers have developed models that illustrate the system-wide costs and environmental 
impacts associated with various levels of recycling targets (Bloemhof-Ruwaard et al., 1996; 
Quariguasi Frota Neto et al., 2008), research has just begun to examine the impact of mandatory 
collection targets (e.g., Walter and Spengler, 2005), which the EU WEEE Directive requires. 
Stipulating higher collection targets than recycling targets, to the extent that it results in even 
greater amounts of materials being recovered, can reduce prices and thus lead to greater 
substitution for virgin materials. If demand for this additional material fails to materialize, 
however, segregated collection of the additional material could waste transportation and 
collection resources and might even become a source of pollution. Future research should 
determine whether and how mandatory collection targets above and beyond recycling targets can 
elicit environmental benefits, and which products and materials make good candidates for these 
dual targets.  20 
 
More research is needed to identify which EOL products make good targets for take-back 
policies. Only tentative steps have been taken to address this question. For example, Rose 
suggests that the decision to remanufacture, disassemble and then recycle, recycle without prior 
disassembly, or simply dispose of an EOL product is based on product durability, rate of 
technological obsolescence, product complexity, duration of a design cycle, and reason for 
redesigns (among other factors) (Rose, 2000). Some have argued that remanufacturing is 
particularly well suited to EOL products the components of which feature slow technological 
obsolescence, and when ex ante uncertainty regarding usage intensity results in “over-
engineering for certain user groups in order to meet the needs of other user groups” (Klausner 
and Henderickson, 2000). To reduce environmental impact, EPR regulations should target two 
types of products: (1) those that if diverted from landfills and incinerators would reduce 
downstream environmental harm; and (2) those that if recovered would provide materials that 
substitute for more environmentally harmful virgin substances. In practice, determining the 
appropriate scope of coverage depends on the extent to which scientific evidence determines a 
product’s or material’s toxicity, and much of this science is still in its infancy. Indeed, some 
legislation permits regulators to broaden the scope of EPR regulations to include additional 
substances as scientific evidence emerges demonstrating toxicity concerns.  
Finally, product take-back regulations have evoked concerns about international trade. 
Although one EU case has addressed the international trade implications of a Danish law that 
requires all beer and soft drinks to be sold exclusively in returnable containers (Kromarek, 1990; 
von Moltke, 1993), little research has investigated the implications of take-back regulations on 
international treaties including whether they violate obligations imposed by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Technical 21 
 
Barriers to Trade, as alleged by the American Electronics Association (Scigliano, 1999), and 
whether such regulations are consistent with the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, and the pending Basel Ban. 
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